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Should Banking be Left to the Bankers? A Comparison 
of the Great Depression and the Great Financial Crisis 
 
Elisabeth Kirkby 
 
G.K. Chesterton wrote ‘The Secret People’ in 1915, but his words also express the despair 
felt by the unemployed in the 1930s, struggling against events outside their control. 
 
They fight us by shuffling papers; they have bright dead alien eyes; 
And they look on our labour and laughter as a tired man looks at flies. 
And the load of their loveless pity is worse than the ancient wrongs, 
Their doors are shut in the evening: and they know no songs.  
 
Unfeeling central bankers and economic theorists dictated monetary policy in the 1930s, 
confident in their belief that ‘the market is always right’. Any attempt to control financial 
markets or fiscal policy was anathema, as wild speculation on Wall Street went unchecked. 
This paper examines the events of the 1930s in Australia, and the way in which bankers in 
Australia were manipulated by British financial interests in general and the Bank of 
England in particular. In 2007 and 2008, the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) was a reminder 
of the Great Depression and the years of unemployment and social unrest; the policies of 
the econocrats who had boasted that the Great Crash of 1929 could never happen again 
were proved wrong. It is the aim of this paper to show that history can’t be ignored, that 
the interests of powerful financial institutions need to be controlled. It is an attempt to 
understand the mistakes made in Australia in the 1930s, in order to ensure that prudent 
management and effective regulation will be the way of the future. 
 
 
In the opening chapter of her book, The March of Folly, Barbara Tuchman posed the 
question: ‘Why do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way reason points and 
enlightened self interest suggests? Why does intelligent mental process seem so often not to 
function?’1 That question might well have been asked of American bankers and financiers 
in the years leading up to the financial meltdown of 2007 and 2008. The history of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s should have ensured that a thing never happened again. Yet 
in 2008, the leading figures in Wall Street appeared unaware of the lesson that they should 
have learnt from their fathers and grandfathers. Where was the corporate memory? 
I say this because as many commentators are warning that the crisis may not be 
over, even though in Australia, the impact of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) is not as 
severe as was feared twelve months ago. It was the events of 2007 and 2008 that persuaded 
me to attempt a thesis based on the impact of the 1930s depression in Australia. After the 
idea had been accepted by the Department of Business and Organisational Studies at 
Sydney University, the sponsors of this conference and this new association, I started to 
research the period, I have now spent nearly twelve months reading about the personalities 
involved, trying to assess their motivation and studying archival material to discover why 
so many, presumably highly intelligent men, got things so wrong in the 1930s, and how 
could their errors be repeated seventy five years later? Yet recently financial commentators 
in both Britain and the United States have compared the meltdown of 1930 with the GFC, 
and are asking the question ‘What went wrong?’ 
David Blanchflower, Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College, New 
Hampshire, and a past member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) states that ‘economic theories failed just when we needed them most’. Describing 
AAHANZBS Conference 2009 
 2
the Bank of England as ‘The Bank of Economic Theory’, he admits ‘that the bank needed 
the advice of experienced bankers, lawyers, businessmen and market regulators’, and 
asserts: 
 
There were too few regulators on the staff. Instead the Bank was stocked full of 
mathematical modellers who had never seen the inside of a commercial bank or a 
hedge fund – and the models they used failed to pick up on the greatest financial 
crisis in a century.2 
 
The Bank of England had learnt little over the past seventy five years and it was the Bank 
of England that attempted to control Australia’s fiscal policy in the 1930s, allowing the 
‘mathematical modelers’ of that era to manage the impact of the Great Depression in 
Australia.  
In 1930, R.H. Tawney, a leading Labour intellectual and a contemporary of G.D.H. 
Cole and Harold Laski, stated ‘the British Government did not fall with a crash, in a 
tornado from the blue. But crawled slowly to its doom’.3 He could have been describing the 
Australian Labor Party led by J. H. Scullin when it was attempting to reconcile the views of 
Labor firebrands such as Billy Hughes and Jack Lang with those of the bankers, Sir 
Montagu Norman, Chairman of the Bank of England, and Sir Robert Gibson, Chairman of 
the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. According to Schedvin, ‘Gibson thrived on his 
position of power … [he] knew little of the intricacies of banking and nothing of central 
banking … his influence over major decisions was complex and it even extended to the 
detailed running of the Bank’.4 
When Scullin became Prime Minister within weeks of the Stock Market Crash on 
Wall Street, he was placed in the unenviable position of trying to stabilise the Australian 
economy at a time when the Chairman of the Bank of England was ‘anxious’ to advise 
Australia on economic matters, and the Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
was an inexperienced financier at loggerheads with the Governor of the Bank, E.C. Riddle. 
To make matters worse, Gibson would not accept expert advice: ‘He would listen to no 
view that did not conform with his own narrow orthodoxy and would brook no compromise 
with the sacred principles of sound finance.’5 
The new Labor Administration was confronted with a world depression, an 
overwhelming national debt inherited from the Bruce/Page Government, when the 
Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank distrusted experts and was convinced of his own 
infallibility. The complex relationship between the Australian Government and the Bank of 
England should be understood against this background. 
Schedvin’s history of the Great Depression is based on archival sources, but he 
states that his research was limited by what he describes as ‘a wilderness of printed 
Parliamentary Papers and Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates’. He also comments on 
the fact that in the preparation of his book, both the Reserve Bank of Australia and the 
Commonwealth Bank Archives Office ‘declined permission to document in the customary 
fashion. The Treasury also required some deletions and amendments of direct quotations 
from a few files’.6 
It would be interesting to discover why. Personal research at the Bank of England 
suggests that during the Depression, the Australian Government was skilfully controlled by 
Britain for her own advantage. The interests of the British Government were paramount and 
Australian interests were disregarded. Whether this would have occurred if someone other 
than Sir Robert Gibson had been Chairman of the Bank is a matter for debate, but there is 
no doubt that the visit of Sir Otto Niemeyer to Australia in 1930 was the result of ‘behind 
the scenes’ negotiations between Sir Robert Gibson and senior Bank of England officials 
with the knowledge of Sir Montagu Norman. 
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It could be suggested they felt confident that they were acting correctly, as the visit 
to Australia in 1927 of Sir Ernest Harvey, Comptroller of the Bank of England, had been a 
great success. According to Sayers, Harvey ‘was a tactful and diplomatic messenger and 
laid the foundations for excellent relations between the two banks’.7 
But in 1927, Stanley Bruce was Prime Minister with business contacts in London, 
and there was no thought of a world financial crisis. By 1930, Scullin was the new Labor 
Prime Minister, Wall Street had collapsed and Sir Otto Niemeyer proved to be far from ‘a 
tactful and diplomatic messenger’. 
The genesis of his visit was a confidential letter written by Sir Ernest Harvey, as 
deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to Sir Ernest Clark who was a prominent business 
man in London, a director of Martin’s Bank and the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. 
He had been part of Harvey’s earlier mission to Australia as a member of the Joint 
Exchequer Board of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Clark was the type of man that 
bank bureaucrats would turn to, after Australia had elected a Labor Government. Harvey 
requested a meeting to ‘learn more of conditions in Australia’ saying that the matter was 
urgent as ‘S.M. Bruce is coming to see the Governor of the Bank of England tomorrow, 1 
April 1st, 1930’.8 
Although after his defeat in the 1929 election, Bruce had returned to his business 
interests in London, he held no official position. According to his biographer, Heather Radi, 
he was conferring with Bank of England officials ‘in order to provide some relief on the 
acute problems of Australian government overdrafts’.9 She also suggests that he was 
determined to return to politics, and perhaps this is why he took this ‘duty’ upon himself. In 
1930, Australia’s High Commissioner in London was Sir Granville Ryrie, appointed by 
Bruce in 1927 for reasons that were spelt out in a letter from the Governor-General, Lord 
Stonehaven, in a letter to Lord Salisbury. 
 
Ryrie is a quite different type from previous High Commissioners … a typical 
Australian country gentleman – the third generation in a family of squatters – Bruce 
chose him because he wanted to have a man representing Australia in London who 
would become persona grata, not only in official circles but in others not much 
frequented by High Commissioners hitherto, possibly through lack of opportunity or 
inclination.10 
 
It is interesting speculate if Ryrie was aware that Bruce approached the Bank of 
England personally in 1930, or whether Ryrie would have disapproved of negotiations with 
the Bank of England that he had not been asked to conduct as High Commissioner? 
Whatever the reason, Bruce started negotiations with the Bank that were not revealed to the 
Commonwealth Parliament.  
  After the initial approach by Bruce, matters moved swiftly. On 6 May a confidential 
cable was sent by Sir Ernest Harvey to Sir Robert Gibson, as Chairman of the 
Commonwealth Bank, outlining ways in which the Bank of England might assist Australia 
to overcome the economic crisis: 
 
a) We could stand aside altogether and await developments. 
b) We could confer with a special intermediary sent here privately by the 
     Commonwealth Government. 
c) We could perhaps send privately ourselves if invited to do so and if he would be  
     taken into full confidence.11 
 
The cable was acknowledged on 12 May and a reply in code was sent on 16 May. Gibson 
rejected option A with the words, ‘Sincerely hope you will not adopt this policy without 
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further efforts to assist in solving our problems’. He said option B was ‘not practicable. 
Selection of unbiased intermediary capable of providing true picture unlikely’. But he could 
HEARTILY APPROVE the third option and revealed that ‘the relationship between the 
Board and the Government harmonious but no real confidence and cooperation exists’. 
Gibson added that if the Governor of the Bank of England was conferring with S. M. 
Bruce: 
 
suggest you inform him not prepared to negotiate further without clear 
understanding position and assurances as to future but you are prepared to send your 
own intermediary if invited by the government to do so on the understanding that he 
will be taken into full confidence, have full facilities to investigate and freedom to 
confer with present Commonwealth Bank Board and such other sources as wisdom 
may dictate and you will be guided in your future activities by result of such 
investigation.12 
 
Schedvin refers to this correspondence in his book, Australia and the Great Depression, 
and offers his opinion that for Australia to send another intermediary to London was 
 
an extraordinary proposal for the government was already well represented in 
London … the Commonwealth and Loan Council representative, J.R. Collins, knew 
all the facts and was an experienced and tough negotiator. The Commonwealth 
Bank’s London manager, J. Scott was also an able representative who knew all the 
facts.13  
 
It was Schevdin’s view that the Bank of England was angling for an invitation to send an 
intermediary to visit Australia, ‘without appearing to intrude into domestic affairs’.14 
Sayers suggests that the way the Bank of England operated was governed by 
‘habitual secretiveness: when anything did come to the public eye, the darkness before and 
after meant that there was little chance of understanding’.15 In this case, the secrecy 
surrounding the discussions between the Bank of England and the Commonwealth Bank 
suited Gibson very well as he states at the end of the cable of 16 May, ‘you will appreciate 
self and colleagues Bank Board difficult positioning view of tenure of appointment, 
proposed banking legislation and uncertainty any future connection with the Bank in any 
form’. This decoded cable is marked in red ink to denote comments of prime importance, 
and refers to the fact that Theodore, as Treasurer, had introduced a Central Reserve Bank 
Bill on 2 May which (if it passed) would mean there would be a new chairman of a new 
board. The arrival in Australia of a delegation from the Bank of England would delay the 
legislation and Gibson might find powerful allies in his fight against the change. 
Between 16 and 31 May, after further cables between Gibson and Harvey, it was 
agreed that the Bank of England would send an adviser to Australia, and the ‘Approach 
should be made through Bank of England to High Commissioner to the Prime Minister of 
Australia … It would be the Bank’s wish to avoid publicity so far and so long as 
possible’.16  
On 6 June, the letter of invitation was sent from Prime Minister Scullin to the Bank 
of England through J.R. Collins at Australia House. It was addressed to Sir Ernest Harvey 
as Comptroller of the Bank of England. On 11 June, Harvey cabled Gibson that the chosen 
adviser, Sir Otto Niemeyer, would sail for Australia aboard the ‘Cathay’ on 18 June. Only 
six weeks had elapsed since Bruce went to talk with Sir Montagu Norman, and it took only 
a week after the invitation was accepted for Sir Otto Niemeyer to be on his way. It seems 
obvious that the Bank of England was very anxious to be in a position where it could 
control events in Australia. 
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Scullin announced the arrival of a Bank of England representative to the House after 
Question Time on 17 June. 
 
The Commonwealth Government is determined that all necessary steps shall be 
taken to meet promptly all Australia’s obligations, and as the Bank of England has 
expressed a willingness to assist Australia to find a solution to the present 
difficulties, the Government and the Bank have mutually agreed there should be a 
consultation in Australia between representatives of the Bank of England, the 
Commonwealth Government and the Commonwealth Bank Board. A representative 
of the Bank of England will accordingly visit Australia. He left London yesterday 
accompanied by an economist and an officer of the Bank of England.17 
 
There was no debate and no parliamentary approval was sought. Just the bald 
announcement which Lang believed treated Australia ‘as if it were a bankrupt nation and 
Sir Otto was to fulfil the role of Liquidator in Chief’.18 Lang also queried the fact that 
messages passing between London and Canberra had never been divulged; he also objected 
to the opinions of Professor Gregory, the Bank of England economist:  
 
the real world, the world which matters in modern business is not the actual physical 
structure at all. The real world which matters in business as in economics is the 
balance sheet which those physical structures actually represent … in other words, 
whether we like it or not, in every state of society in which money is used, all these 
concrete phenomena, farms and farmhouses, and human beings and buildings, and 
equipment of one kind or another are in the final analysis plotted down on a balance 
sheet.19 
 
Lang was astute enough to realise that Niemeyer and Gregory had come to Australia with 
only one purpose: ‘They were going to draw up the balance sheet. They were going to value 
the assets at knock-down prices.’20 The unemployed would appear as liabilities, those in 
work by their earning capacity. Yet in 1930, J.G. Latham, as leader of the Opposition, rose 
to congratulate Scullin, and stated his belief that ‘the gentlemen who are coming from 
England will be of great benefit to Australia’.21 
It is clear that the Federal Parliament had no understanding of the impact of the 
growing Depression. By 1930, there were over ten million people unemployed world-wide, 
and eventually over 700,000 would be unemployed in Australia, over 40,000 working for 
no wages, and 21,000 youths who had yet to experience employment.22 But as far as 
Niemeyer and Gregory were concerned, the most important issue was to ensure that 
Australia paid its creditors on time, whatever the cost in terms of human suffering. The 
balance sheet had to be balanced. 
After only a month is Australia, Niemeyer reported directly to Sir Montagu 
Norman: 
 
August 14th 1930.  
Australia is a poor country probably overpopulated with a higher percentage of 
unemployed than the U.K. Settlement has hitherto been very costly and further 
development at the moment seems to me to be insane. 
 
September 1st 1930. 
It is almost impossible to convey an adequate notion of the jarring elements at all 
times in this country. The petty feuds on every conceivable subject are unlimited 
both in number and bitterness. The ignorance of different sections of the population 
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of one another’s real feelings, problems and objects, the jealousies between political 
parties and between different wings of the same political party and between the 
States inter se, and as a body with the Commonwealth could hardly be equalled in a 
small cathedral town. With endless scrapping, there is an extraordinary absence of 
constructive criticism.23  
 
It is obvious that Niemeyer had not read the history of Federation before he arrived. He 
may have seen bank managers at half hour intervals but he does not appear to have visited 
factories, mines or dockyards. People came to him, he did not go to them, unless it was to 
go to the races or to visit their country estates. Of course some of his informants may have 
been as financially illiterate as the business man quoted by Shann: 
 
One applicant named Bernstein, who had applied for an increase of 20 per cent on 
duties already at 40 and 30 percent was unable to give any information as to 
manufacturing costs. He said ‘I am not aware of our profits for the past three years, 
I do not know anything about finance’.24 
 
Niemeyer became increasingly unpopular, which is easy to understand if his attitude 
reflected the views he expressed to Sir Montagu Norman: ‘The personnel all round, 
political, administrative and banking – is, with rare exceptions lamentable, a circumstance 
which is accentuated by marooning the Commonwealth Government and administration on 
a sheep station two hundred miles from anywhere.’25 He was probably not the first financier 
who believed Canberra was too far away from the Melbourne Club, where Niemeyer stayed 
when he was in Melbourne. 
Giblin described Niemeyer as ‘the freak child of the ill-conditioned Anglo-
Australian embrace of the interwar years’. The authors of Giblin’s Platoon were even more 
critical: ‘[D]uring a four month tour of port drinking and golfing, he floated a series of 
stringent judgements about his host country which ranged from the dubious to the 
asinine.’26 But it didn’t take Niemeyer four months to tell the ‘lamentable’ politicians what 
they had to do. By August, he was ready to give ‘the political leaders [who] were listless 
and frightened and generally unable to give a lead’ their instructions. Commonwealth and 
State representatives were summoned to Melbourne for a Premier’s Conference, where 
Niemeyer, with Gibson at his side, told them that there could be no recovery unless primary 
producers reduced their costs and no relief unless the country’s finances were put in order.27 
Niemeyer was emphatic: ‘Australia is off Budget equilibrium, off exchange equilibrium 
and forced by considerable unfunded and maturing debts, both internally and externally … 
Australia must reassure the world as to the direction in which she is going.’28 
The Premier’s Conference was held in camera; due to illness Scullin was not present 
and was represented by Deputy Prime Minister Fenton. Lyons attended as acting Treasurer 
in the absence of Theodore.29 The decisions were being made by deputies and not by those 
responsible for the implementation of those decisions. 
Although by 21 August, Scullin had recovered sufficiently to be present when the 
official statement was issued at the end of the Conference, it was signed by H. J. Sheehan, 
Secretary to the Conference; yet in theory it was binding on all State Governments as well 
as the Federal Government. It was a statement that reflected the views of the conservative 
financiers and economists, leaving Scullin’s supporters too confused to take a stand against 
the draconian cuts in wages and working conditions; in fact, it had been drawn up by 
Niemeyer based on a draft letter sent to Scullin on 3 August (when Niemeyer had been in 
Australia for all of three weeks). A letter that Niemeyer stated he ‘would find of use if 
signed by the Representatives of Commonwealth and states’. Clause One reads: ‘It is the 
fixed intention and determination of the several governments to balance their respective 
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Budgets for the financial years 1930/31, and to maintain similar budget equilibrium in 
future.’30 The Federal Government and the State Governments had been told what they had 
to do, but they had not been told how they were to do it.  
The crisis atmosphere engendered by Niemeyer’s demands was reflected in the 
media describing those who did not support deflationary policies as ‘extremists’ or 
‘repudiationists’. The Opposition condemned ‘irresponsible elements in Australia – the 
menacing tones issuing from their extreme followers’.31 The editorial of the Sun warned 
that ‘three English banks – the Bank of Australasia, Union Bank and E.S.A. Bank – could 
make Australia bankrupt and would do so unless Australia balanced her budget’.32 Robert 
Menzies, then legal adviser to the Commonwealth Bank, declared that ‘he would rather see 
every Australian die of starvation than fail to honour contractual debts in their entirety’.33 
An extravagant statement that reflected the views of big business and right wing financiers. 
  In the 1930s, when most economists believed that ‘deflation and a balanced budget’ 
would restore prosperity, the politicians of the day were not even united on party lines. At 
each election between 1922 and 1938, party allegiances changed and long established 
principles of social justice were abandoned for short-term political gain. Macintyre states: 
 
Lacking any clear vision of national purpose, unable to sustain altruistic ideals of 
duty and service, and unwilling to repudiate the ethic of competitive self-
satisfaction, caught between loyalty to Empire and national interest when they 
threatened to fly apart, the ruling class fell back on symbols.34 
 
One of the most cherished symbols was the need to maintain a laissez faire 
economy. There is also no doubt that the impact of the financial crisis and the remedies that 
were being imposed on the Labor Government were reinforced by fears of communism, the 
view held by many conservative Australians. Samuel Girling, NSW Agent and Attorney 
wrote to the Bank of England: ‘NSW Government entirely indifferent as regards English 
interests and take instructions only from Trades Hall who are definitely opposed to Empire 
interests, thinking only of self and Red elements.’35 The same stance was taken by the 
Australian Industries Protection League, according to the secretary, A. Hume Cook: ‘By 
reason of political inequality, the Commonwealth of Australia is practically in the hands of 
the masses … as production costs are very largely made up of wages paid to labour, the 
position is very serious.’36 A view that Niemeyer would have endorsed, as Professor 
Gregory did on 29 August: ‘[W]ages here were too high in relation to population and must 
fall. Interest rates could not be forcibly reduced without danger. (Lower rates would deter 
investment).’37 
On 8 August, two weeks before the Melbourne Agreement was signed, Niemeyer 
wrote a sixteen page letter to Harvey at the Bank of England; starting ‘Dear Mr. Deputy’, 
he describes Australian Commonwealth Treasury officials as 
  
a nice paralytic, a cunning rogue and an unknown quantity (Scotch) … Scullin is a 
very decent little man … The last thing that is good for Australia at the moment is to 
be told that everyone has faith in her and that she will undoubtedly pull through … I 
do not doubt this myself … I think it would do no harm for you to appear if anything 
more dubious and stony-hearted than I am. 
 
In handwriting at the bottom of the letter, are the words, ‘Give an Australian half a mile and 
he’s off to Eldorado straight away’.38 David Clark has shrewdly assessed Niemeyer’s 
advice: ‘Niemeyer’s report ruled out any talk of ‘Keynesian’ stimulation but his emphasis 
on wage earners taking the brunt was not politically feasible.’39 
 
AAHANZBS Conference 2009 
 8
The controversy that occurred after the Melbourne Agreement became public 
increased after Niemeyer had sailed for England in November 1930. Bankers and financiers 
wrote to him deploring the fact that the Agreement was already being disregarded. The 
Labor Party, with Scullin away in London at an Imperial Conference, was divided on how 
they could carry out the proposed economic reforms. They faced ‘a political exercise in 
making a pious declaration of the Melbourne Agreement palatable to the party 
membership’.40 
It was a task that proved impossible as influential members of the Labor Party, 
Frank Anstey, Jack Lang and Billy Hughes, believed that the Agreement should be 
repudiated. The Financial News reported comments made by Billy Hughes in the Sydney 
Gazette: ‘the advice of Sir Otto, a policy of stagnation and despair to stampede and drive us 
into a compound where the financial interests that he represents want us’.41 According to 
Macintyre, 
 
the radical members of the caucus denounced the Melbourne Agreement and called 
on the ministers to overcome the opposition of the bankers and resist any cuts; they 
were encouraged by Labor’s victory in the New South Wales election in October 
1930 which Lang fought on that basis.42 
 
The secrecy that had surrounded the invitation to Sir Otto Niemeyer now came back 
to haunt Scullin. The Sydney Morning Herald reported on 28 October that Theodore had 
attacked Scullin for inviting Niemeyer, and offered their opinion that Theodore had invited 
Niemeyer. Hughes was to state that ‘even if the Government issued the invitation, outside 
elements inspired it’.43  
Both Hughes and Lang attempted to persuade their colleagues that the views 
expressed by Niemeyer did not reflect the views of all economists. Hughes quoted 
Beaumont Pease, the President of Lloyds Bank, who didn’t support cutting wages, he cited 
financiers in the United States ‘who have agreed together to avoid any fall in wages’. But in 
Australia, orthodox deflationary policy was accepted by the right wing of the Labor Party. 
The critics of such policy were considered dangerous revolutionaries, at least in the eyes of 
some members of the public; one was Alfred Waley, who wrote to the Bank of England, 
‘Australia is rapidly approaching the Russian revolutionary ideas and will be fortunate if it 
escapes violence and rioting on a large scale’.44 To do him justice, when asked to reply to 
this comment, Raymond Kershaw, Australian-born Bank of England adviser to Niemeyer, 
dismissed such paranoia: ‘I do not believe that Australia is ‘moving on Russian lines! I do 
not believe that they know what Russian lines are and I do not believe they would like them 
if they did.’45 
Yet the fears expressed by Alfred Waley had persuaded many Australians to join the 
New Guard in New South Wales and the White Army in Victoria. It was fear of 
communism that fuelled the hysteria when a rumour circulated the Mallee town of Ouyen 
that ‘the communists had seized Sydney and their counterparts were even now advancing 
on Melbourne from Mildura’.46 The retiring Governor-General, Lord Stonehaven, also 
believed that the financial crisis in Australia was caused by ‘imported agitators from 
Maynooth and Moscow’.47 
Such opinions made ‘orthodox’ economic theory palatable, and when Niemeyer’s 
advice was disputed, Scullin turned to Australian economists in an attempt to find less 
drastic solutions. Yet in spite of the confusion in the Labor Party, Niemeyer had supporters, 
many who wrote to him after he left Australia. In a handwritten letter to Niemeyer on 
Commonwealth Treasury letterhead, Professor Jackson apologised because the Labor 
Government was not following his advice: 
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If we had only ‘played the game’ I feel sure that we would have secured the 
sympathy of one whose influence on our side on the future would have been of 
material help. 
In shame and sorrow, 
Yours truly, H.E. Jackson.48 
 
The Constitutional Club in Adelaide regretted the abuse and insinuations hurled at 
Sir Otto: ‘this is not a true indication of the attitude of the majority of Australians. The link 
between Australia and the ‘Mother Country’ must not be broken’.49 The New South Wales 
Constitutional Association sent a letter to the Bank of England, ‘for discourtesy shown to 
Sir Otto Niemeyer by certain newspapers and politicians’. The Sydney Morning Herald 
insisted that ‘Niemeyer’s visit was the subject of “gross misrepresentation”. Sir Otto did not 
come to Australia at the instance of the British Government or British Banking interests. 
The allegation that he is a sort of bailiff inspecting the assets is grotesquely false’.50 
Such letters received a reply from Sir Montagu Norman with what can only be 
described as ‘warm’ hypocrisy conveying ‘the appreciation of the Bank, in allowing Sir 
Otto to visit Australia, the Bank was solely influenced by the desire to assist the 
Government and the people of Australia’.51 
Of course, Niemeyer’s supporters were conservative financiers and businessmen 
who were uneasy with a Labor Government. Their views were supported by Sir Alfred 
Davidson, the General Manager of the Bank of New South Wales, and by Melville, 
Professor of Economics at Adelaide University, who was on loan to the Commonwealth 
Bank as an adviser. It was in a letter to Melville that Niemeyer described Australians as 
‘gutless’, and strongly criticised Copland and Giblin. Even after his return to England, 
Niemeyer received regular ‘up dates’ concerning events in Australia. A letter from Young 
of Elders in Adelaide is indicative of the gulf that divided Labor politicians, and 
conservative business men. Young describes Scullin as ‘without capacity’, and both Scullin 
and Theodore as ‘evil’. He continues: 
 
Gibson is splendidly firm … You will be glad to hear that Melville is still doing 
famously … Copland has discarded any former weakness he may have had and he 
and Melville are working loyally together also Shann from Perth who is helping the 
Bank of New South Wales.52 
 
Perhaps it was the support that Niemeyer received from Collins Street and like-
minded Australians in financial institutions that encouraged him to involve himself in the 
Royal Commission into Banking and Monetary Systems established by Prime Minister 
Lyons in 1934. The proposal to convert the Commonwealth Bank of Australia into two 
institutions had been brought to the attention of the Bank of England in March 1930, by 
Tritton, the Chairman of the London Board of the Bank of New South Wales. Together 
with Campbell of the Sydney office, Tritton was concerned that the Government intended 
to 1) Create a Central Bank, 2) undertake the business of a trading bank in aggressive 
competition with other trading banks. He suggested to the Bank of England that differences 
of opinion between the Bank and the Government might ‘lead to the resignation of the 
present board or the supersession of the present board by some new body’.53 Leaving aside 
the propriety of a trading bank in New South Wales trying to discover from the Bank of 
England what the Government of Australia might be planning, their approach gave Sir 
Montagu Norman the opportunity to assure Niemeyer that ‘We should welcome effective 
control of London office [of the proposed new bank] by Strakosch and yourself’.54 
The Bank of England was already aware of the draft bill that had been introduced by 
Theodore as Treasurer in May 1930, and that the Federal Government intended to form a 
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new Central Reserve Bank with capital of ₤2,000,000 taken from the Commonwealth Bank. 
It was to have a board of nine members to be appointed for seven years by the Governor-
General representing banking, commerce, labour, manufacturing and primary production. 
The salaries of the Governor and Deputy Governor would be fixed by the Governor-
General and the bank would have the power to issue notes. A detailed critique of this 
proposal was sent to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia by Sir Ernest Harvey in his 
capacity as Comptroller of the Bank of England as Sir Robert Gibson had appeared before 
Senate Select Committee established to assess the legislation in 1931.  
In 1934, a Royal Commission was established to look into Banking and Monetary 
Matters, comprising J.P. Abbott, President of the Graziers Association of New South 
Wales; H.A. Pitt, Financial Director, Victoria; Ben Chifley, MHR; R.C. Mills, Professor of 
Economics at Sydney University; and Mr. Justice Napier of South Australia. 
Although the Bank of England had previously supported ‘central banks’, Niemeyer 
advised Sir Claude Reading(who had taken over as Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank 
of Australia), that Australia did not need a central bank. In 1935, Niemeyer went even 
further, advising Reading in a personal letter: 
 
For instance let the other banks give evidence before you, yourself appear … I 
suppose you could inspire the other banks as to what they had better say if they are 
asked about a central bank and I imagine you could square the Chairman of the 
Commission as to the moment at which you yourself are interviewed. In any case I 
should have thought that the more you can draw other people’s fire the better.55 
 
This first ‘advice’ was followed later by an instruction to the Overseas and Foreign 
Department of the Bank of England, 16 May 1936. 
 
Sir Otto Niemeyer would like notes prepared for Sir Claude Reading 
a) Post Office interference with Commonwealth Bank’s operations; 
b) Fixed rates for ‘Banker’ deposits with Bank of England. 
 
Instructions were then issued daily from Niemeyer to Reading between 15 and 19 May 
1936; Niemeyer comments on Readings’ figures and suggests the total is expressed in ‘less 
terrifying form’. These letters are four and five pages long, commenting on Reading’s 
proposed evidence, revising it and circulating it for further expert approval. A 
memorandum dated 20 May 1936 states: 
 
Sir Otto Niemeyer, Professor Clay and I have been in almost daily consultation with 
Reading regarding the C.B.A’s Deferred Answers to the Royal Commission 
questionnaire. Assistance was also offered to A.F. Bell, Acting Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the Commonwealth Bank and a critical letter from Niemeyer 
to Reading disputing Australia’s legal opinions.56 
 
It is signed G.E.J; Professor Jackson was an adviser to the Bank of England. 
In September 1936, the Royal Commission asked to see some of the 
communications between the Commonwealth Bank and the Bank of England: ‘[A.F. Bell] 
saw the Commission in camera … pointed out that such a request would be against the 
national interest. The Commission withdrew their request which was a distinct relief.’57 
There can be no doubt that the Bank of England was ‘advising’ two Commonwealth 
Bank Chairmen, Sir Robert Gibson and Sir Claude Reading from 1930 to 1936, and that the 
way they communicated was secret, and was only revealed to the Australian Government, 
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and the economists who were working for Treasury and for Australian banks, at the 
discretion of Sir Montagu Norman and Sir Otto Niemeyer.  
Yet when Gibson was called before a Senate Select Committee in 1931, he was 
asked by Senator Foll: ‘Has there been at any time, any attempt on the part of the Bank of 
England to dictate the policy of the Commonwealth Bank?’  
 
Gibson replied: ‘Absolutely on no occasion. Further the Commonwealth Bank 
would not accept such dictation.’ 
 
Pitt: ‘That is still the present position?’ 
 
Gibson: Yes, 
 
Pitt: ‘It is stated occasionally that our banking policy is dictated overseas, either 
London or Geneva, and you say “Absolutely on no occasion”, that is not the case?’ 
 
Gibson: ‘It is not the case.’ 
 
Pitt: ‘Are there any grounds whatsoever for that statement?’ 
 
Gibson: ‘None whatsoever.’58 
 
It would appear that Gibson had the same poor opinion of Senate Select Committees as 
Niemeyer, who held them ‘in contempt’. It is also clear that conservative bankers ignored 
all opinions other than their own or those of their conservative advisers; that the Labor 
Government of the 1930s was too weak to challenge them, and the United Australia Party 
(UAP) Government led by Lyons meekly followed deflationary policies that resulted in 
high unemployment. The views of concerned citizens such as Dr. M.C. De Garis were 
ignored: 
 
Unemployment is a major social and national problem. It entails under-nourishment 
of men, women and children, it saps their physical energies and their self respect, 
because they are useless and not wanted in the world … It has already raised our 
maternal and infant death rates, and lowered the birth rate, and our rate of natural 
increase, also wiping out all increase by migration. These dire results demand 
enquiry into its causes. Bankers, therefore perforce ignore unemployment; it is 
impossible for them (under accepted theory) to deal with unemployed men 
individually. Governments, however, cannot take this attitude.59 
 
It is unusual to find a medical man entering into the debate on banking and linking the 
plight of the unemployed with the financial policy dictated by the banks. Dr De Garis may 
have believed that ‘governments cannot take this attitude’. Unfortunately, during the Great 
Depression, governments in Australia as in Britain did ‘take this attitude’. Schedvin wrote 
of the ‘many other economic, political, institutional and social changes that flowed directly 
or indirectly, from the searing experience of mass unemployment, widespread bankruptcy, 
disastrous commodity prices, political turmoil and social upheaval’.60 He was also honest 
enough to admit that ‘the modicum of relief expenditure that was sanctioned was not only 
totally inadequate but was also distorted by an unrealistic insistence that expenditure be 
confined to ‘reproductive’ works’.61 
If history is to teach us anything, then we must look carefully at the Depression of 
the 1930s, and the inadequate measures that were undertaken to relieve the poverty and 
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distress that resulted. There was no equality of sacrifice then, just as there is no equality of 
sacrifice today. Bankers and financiers are still resisting attempts at regulation. They still 
defend obscene salaries, according to the New Statesman, there is now a new buzzword in 
the City – ‘BAB’, or ‘bonuses are back’.62 We must ensure that this time we do not follow 
the dictates of corporate governors. Australia can introduce regulation even if Wall Street 
and Threadneedle Street do not. 
In the foreword to his epic work on Primitive Mythology, Joseph Campbell wrote: 
‘I can see no reason why anyone should suppose that in the future the same motifs already 
heard will not be sounding still … put to use by reasonable men to reasonable ends or by 
madmen to nonsense and disaster.’63 We have the opportunity to prove we are ‘reasonable 
men’, and as ‘reasonable men’, we should remember that Ross Garnaut ascribed the failure 
of HIH to ‘weak regulatory arrangements, incentive structures that encourage senior 
executives to risk their businesses for personal gain, advisers who were compromised by 
conflicts of interest’.64 Garnaut also states that ‘Australian banks engaged in their own 
dramatic expansion of shadow banking activities in the form of a vast increase in offshore 
borrowing which fuelled an explosion of lending for housing and consumption’.65 
We can remember the hardship of the 1930s as part of history, but as we do so, we 
must remember that the same hardship could still be repeated, even if for different reasons, 
as Paul Kennedy points out: 
 
Today the daily volume of foreign exchange trading is several hundred times larger 
than the value of graded goods … Across the world, millions of overseas investors, 
companies and banks speculate in currencies, many of them automatically following 
computer─ generated indicators that reveal (say) whether the dollar is increasing or 
decreasing in value relative to other currencies.66 
 
Today the Australian dollar is strong and the American dollar is weak, and financial 
commentators describe the situation as a lottery; but we must learn from history. We cannot 
go back to the ‘laisser faire’ attitude of the 1930s that caused such social distress. We must 
not be lulled into a state of false security, believing the worst is over. The worst is not over 
in the U.S.A., or in Britain or in Japan; and we join with them as part of the global 
economy. In this new high-tech world that wheels and deals twenty four hours a day, seven 
days a week, regulation or ‘prudential supervision’ to use the term coined by Ross Gittins, 
is now more important than ever.67 The ‘libertarians’ must not be allowed to persuade 
governments otherwise. 
 
Elisabeth Kirkby is currently working on a PhD thesis on the Social Impact of the Great 
Depression in Australia. From 1981 to 1998, she was a member of the Legislative Council 
in New South Wales as leader of the Australian Democrats. <liskirkby@skymesh.com.au> 
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